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ABSTRACT 
In this paper I put forth three criticisms against McDowell account of the idea that moral 
requirements are categorical imperatives. I argue that McDowell’s account fails as a defense of 
Kant’s doctrine for at least three reasons. First, McDowell claims that agents can appeal to 
experience in order to formulate and recognize categorical imperatives. However, Kant strongly 
disagrees with this claim, explicitly claiming that moral requirements cannot be derived from 
experience. Second, McDowell argues that the virtuous agent will not experience inner conflict 
when motivating herself to act virtuously, but inner conflict plays a central role in Kant’s picture 
of moral motivation and virtue. Third, McDowell does not account for how the moral law serves 
as a necessary incentive to moral action through the a priori feeling of respect. Finally, I suggest 
that my criticisms cast doubt on the validity of McDowell’s account, and provide insights into 
some criteria that an account must meet if it is to be a proper defense of Kant’s doctrine of moral 
requirements as categorical imperatives.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
In his well known paper “Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?” John 
McDowell attempts to vindicate Kant’s doctrine that moral requirements are categorical 
imperatives. By appealing to a quasi-perceptual capacity that the virtuous agent acquires through 
experience, McDowell argues that the facts of an agent’s situation can yield moral imperatives 
that are non-hypothetical.  In this paper, I put forth three objections against McDowell’s defense 
of Kant’s doctrine, arguing that it is not compatible with important ideas put forth by Kant in his 
moral theory.  First, I argue that McDowell’s account flies in the face of Kant’s claim that moral 
requirements cannot be grounded in experience and cannot be recognized and complied with by 
appealing to experience, or to principles derived therefrom (Section IV). Second, I argue that 
McDowell misrepresents Kant’s theory when he claims that moral requirements are categorical 
in the sense that they silence non-moral desires and concerns. This idea is at odds with Kant’s 
account, according to which conflict between moral concerns and non-moral concerns that arise 
from self-love plays a central and necessary role in human moral motivation (Section V). Third, I 
argue that Kant’s claim that all sensible beings need incentives in order to be motivated to act 
tells against McDowell’s idea that people can be motivated to act virtuously solely by 
recognizing facts as reasons for acting. Furthermore, by appealing to the facts of the situation 
alone in order to explain how moral requirements can motivate agents, McDowell ignores the 
role that Kant attributes to respect in motivating virtuous actions (Section VI).  
Through my criticisms of McDowell’s defense, I hope to show that an adequate defense 
of Kant’s doctrine that moral requirements are categorical imperatives must do at least three 
things. First, it must represent the moral law as the preeminent source of moral requirements, 
over and above the empirical facts of a situation. Second, it must be compatible with Kant’s 
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conception of virtue as strength in the struggle against inclinations and non-moral concerns. 
Third, it must include a discussion of the a priori feeling of respect for the moral law, and the 
role it plays in moral motivation by making the moral law the incentive to moral action. Before 
putting forth my objections, I begin by reconstructing Kant’s doctrine of moral requirements, and 
recounting McDowell’s defense of this doctrine.   
2 KANT’S ACCOUNT OF MORAL REQUIREMENTS AS CATEGORICAL 
IMPERATIVES 
According to Kant, moral requirements command categorically, or unconditionally, which 
means that moral requirements command rational agents to carry out actions regardless of 
whether they want to carry these actions out or not. Rational agents are required to comply with 
moral requirements regardless of whether they can fulfill their sense-based desires1 by carrying 
out the actions that these imperatives command. In other words, moral requirements command 
that an agent carry out some action even if she does not want to do so, and even if she cannot 
bring about any result from which she expects to derive pleasure by following the command. 
Moral requirements command agents by appealing to the agent’s reason, and her ability to 
recognize the standards and norms, set forth by the moral law, for the proper exercise of her 
rational capacities. That is, moral requirements place agents under commands in virtue of the fact 
                                                 
1 In the Groundwork Kant says that sense-based desires indicate “dependence upon principles of reason for the 
sake of inclination, namely where reason supplies only the practical rule as to how to remedy the need of 
inclination”(GMS 4:414) Kant seems to mean that sense-based desires are those that motivate the agent to satisfy 
her desires for pleasure, using reason only to discern how she should obtain the pleasant end she desires, rather 
than using reason to discern which end is rational and good, i.e. which end she ought to promote. He uses the 
word pathological to indicate a dependence on sensibility rather than rationality. Throughout this paper I will use 
the term “sense-based desires” to refer to desires that are based on what Kant calls pathological feelings or 
conditions. Kant explains that pathological conditions, such as pathological interests and feelings, are only 
contingently related to the will. This means that they are not features of the will that are shared by all rational 
agents, and thus cannot ground moral requirements or motivate morally valuable actions (KpV 5:21). The term 
sense-based is meant to describe the etiology of such desires. Sense-based desires are generated when an agent 
experiences a certain object or material condition as pleasant and a natural disposition to act so as to obtain the 
pleasant object or state of affairs.  
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that these agents are rational, and the proper use of their rational powers requires that they will 
and act according to the practical principles they prescribe. Moral requirements as categorical 
imperatives command agents to carry out actions for the sake of fulfilling the duties2 set forth by 
the moral law, not for the sake of promoting a further end, or for the sake of some prospective 
outcome of the action commanded.  
For example, a categorical imperative might command that an agent tell the truth even if 
telling the truth is incompatible with satisfying some or all of her desires, e.g., to avoid 
punishment, to keep someone else’s deposit, etc. Because moral requirements do not appeal to an 
agent’s sense-based desires, i.e. desires for whatever happens to please her particular 
sensibilities, they do not derive their rational influence or authority over agents from their sense-
based desires or discretionary ends. Another, and perhaps more intuitive, way of explaining this 
idea is to say that moral requirements state that something ought to be done, and the justification 
for why it ought to be done is not that doing it will help the agent achieve something she desires, 
or promote some discretionary end of hers. Rather, the commands issued by categorical 
imperatives are valid and justifiable because the proper exercise of reason demands adherence to 
the principles they command agents to adopt. Thus, moral requirements have authority over all 
rational human beings, even though all humans have widely different desires that would, if they 
did not have the ability to act in accordance with moral requirements, motivate them to act in 
diverse ways, and promote diverse ends.  
Kant explains that categorical imperatives command agents to act in accordance with 
practical laws, which “refer solely to the will, without regard to what is accomplished through its 
causality,” (KpV 5:20-21). He argues that practical laws differ from practical rules in that they 
determine how an agent should will without considering the effects that so willing can bring 
                                                 
2 In the Groundwork Kant defines duty as, “the necessity of an action from respect for law”  (GMS 4:400). 
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about. Since categorical imperatives tell us what ought to be done objectively, not what ought to 
be done if one has certain sense-based desires, they are objective and universal practical laws 
legislated by reason. Furthermore, these objective practical laws are imperatives for us because 
reason does not alone determine our wills. In other words, since we have desires that tempt us to 
deviate from the dictates of the law, the law commands us to act rather than merely describing 
how we naturally, or in fact, act.  
Being universal and objective, moral requirements only presuppose one condition: the 
agent’s possession of and ability to reason; they do not presuppose as a condition the existence of 
“contingent, subjective conditions, which distinguish one rational being from another” (KpV 
5:21). We can better understand what it means for a requirement to presuppose some condition 
by looking at an example of the conditions that hypothetical imperatives presuppose. Take an 
agent who wants to get away with a crime. She might recognize a hypothetical imperative that 
applies to her that commands that she lie to the police. However, such an imperative presupposes 
at least two conditions: that the agent has a sense-based desire for getting away with the crime, 
and that the laws of nature are such that she can produce such a result by lying to the police. On 
the other hand, she could also recognize a categorical imperative that commands her not to lie, 
and such an imperative would not presuppose that any empirical conditions hold; it would only 
presuppose that she is a rational agent. Requirements of that sort are categorical imperatives in 
that they only appeal to a priori principles of the will of every rational being in order to yield 
commands. In other words, they do not depend on natural or empirical laws regarding which 
actions produce which effects, which objects will produce pleasure in the agent and others, or 
which objects and states of affairs are believed to be good prior to consulting the moral law 
(because these are not necessary but contingent matters) (cf. KpV 5:21-25). Furthermore, the fact 
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that the rational authority of practical laws is independent of all contingent and subjective 
conditions makes them the proper source of moral requirements. This is so because if a 
requirement is to be moral, it must represent some manner of willing and acting as objectively 
necessary, or as necessary for all rational beings. An imperative commands an action that is 
objectively necessary if it applies always and to all rational beings regardless of their sense-based 
desires. Furthermore, only imperatives that are grounded on objective laws describe (or 
command, for human beings) actions that contain the objective necessity had by true moral 
requirements.  
In addition to being independent from all sense-based desires in the normative sense 
discussed above, moral requirements are also independent from all sense-based desires in a 
motivational sense. According to Kant, categorical imperatives motivate agents without 
appealing to the agent’s subjective or sense-based desires for particular objects or states of 
affairs. Since the objects of sense-based desires are not “good absolutely but only in reference to 
[the agent’s] sensibility with regard to its feeling of pleasure and displeasure,”(KpV 5:62) moral 
requirements would be mere hypothetical rather than categorical imperatives if they appealed to 
the agent’s subjective desires in order to motivate themselves to act in accordance with such 
requirements. That is, if an agent is motivated by sense-based desires, she commands herself to 
act hypothetically, for the sake of some further end that she deems pleasant. Such an agent would 
act in accordance with a hypothetical imperative that expresses something like “If you want to 
produce a result that satisfies the desire that motivates you, do x;” she would not act in 
accordance with a categorical imperative that would express something like, “do x, because it is 
good to do x regardless of what comes about as a result.” When an agent gets the motivation to 
follow an imperative from her subjective sense-based desires, she cannot help but be motivated 
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to carry out actions that are mere means to the end of satisfying the desires that are her incentives 
to action. This means that she cannot help but be motivated by hypothetical imperatives that tell 
her what is subjectively necessary as a means to desire satisfaction, not what is objectively 
necessary as an end in itself. Thus moral requirements must be capable of motivating agents 
without recruiting the agent’s sense-based desires as sources of motivation, if they are to be 
categorical, rather than hypothetical, imperatives. 
Since categorical imperatives command that agents carry out certain actions regardless of the 
results that so doing might bring about, an agent can be said to recognize a moral requirement 
only when she recognizes an action as in itself good and necessary to carry out, not just as a good 
or necessary means to some other end that she desires. When an agent recognizes an action as 
unconditionally good, she recognizes that she is categorically commanded to carry out the action 
regardless of whether it is a suitable means to satisfying her sense-based desires. Furthermore, 
rational agents can only recognize the unconditional goodness of an action, or its objective 
necessity, by comparing the maxim that underlies the proposed action to their representation of 
the moral law.3 When an agent formulates a proposed maxim, she can find out whether the action 
that it underlies is categorically commanded, forbidden, or permissible by discerning whether the 
form of her maxim is in agreement with the universal form of the moral law. Thus, Kant explains 
that one can only know that the moral law commands or permits a proposed action “if when your 
reason subjects it [the underlying maxim] to the test of conceiving yourself as also giving 
universal law through it, it qualifies for such a giving of universal law” (MM 6:225). 
 By recognizing an agreement between the action’s underlying maxim and the form of the 
moral law, reason identifies the action as good in itself, or as objectively necessary. Kant 
                                                 
3 A maxim is a subjective practical principle that an agent formulates in order to guide her actions (MM 6:225). For 
example, the maxim that might underlie an agent’s act of telling the truth could be “Never tell a lie even if doing so 
is beneficial.” 
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explains that a maxim is in agreement with the moral law when it is fit for universal legislation. 
In other words, a maxim underlies an action that is morally required or permitted if every 
rational being could endorse a maxim with such a form as a universal practical law, according to 
which all rational beings would determine their behavior. For example, the maxim “Lie 
whenever it is useful to do so” would not be in agreement with the form of the moral law 
because not all rational agents would will that this become a universal practical law. For 
example, the rational agent to whom one intends to lie would not endorse this maxim. 
Furthermore, even the agent proposing this maxim would not endorse it as a universal practical 
law, for she does not will that others adopt this principle as a practical law and, consequently, lie 
to her when they stand to benefit from doing so.  
It is important that agents recognize categorical imperatives through the rational activity of 
comparing their proposed maxims to the form of the moral law because only by doing so can 
they recognize actions that are commanded categorically, or commanded of all rational beings 
who posses certain rational abilities, like the ability for universal self-legislation, the ability to 
restrain their sense-based desires, etc. If an agent discovers an imperative by any means other 
than by comparing her maxim to the moral law, she will only discover hypothetical imperatives 
that command actions as means to some end set by her sense-based desires.  
A further reason why agents must recognize categorical imperatives by comparing their 
maxims to the moral law is that the feeling that this rational activity produces in them, i.e. 
respect, is the only feeling that makes the moral law the sole incentive to action (KpV 5:72-73). 
The feeling of respect that is generated when agents compare their maxims to the law is the only 
feeling that excludes all sense-based desires from determining the agent’s actions. When an 
agent compares her proposed maxim to the law and recognizes that it must be limited or 
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modified so that its form will be in agreement with the moral law, the agent’s reason displays its 
ability to constrain her sense-based desires. Upon recognizing that she can make her maxims 
agree with the moral law by restraining her sense-based desires and inclinations, preventing them 
from determining her will, the agent feels respect for the law and for her rational ability to 
determine her will through the representation of it. Therefore, it is important that agents 
recognize moral requirements through the activity of comparing their maxims to the moral law 
because in doing so they discover their ability to restrain (to some extent) their sense-based 
desires and thus feel respect for pure practical reason and the moral law. Furthermore, only the 
restriction of all sense-based desires can give rise to respect, which is not pathological and thus is 
not destructive of moral motivation. 
As was mentioned before, sense-based desires motivate agents to pursue pleasure in 
accordance with the principle of self-love, rather than in accordance with the principle of 
morality. Because all sense-based desires are inimical to moral motivation, agents must be 
motivated, not by sense-based desires, but by the a priori feeling of respect. Kant argues that 
respect differs from sense-based desires because it is “practically effected” not “pathologically 
effected” (KpV 5:77). Kant explains that respect, unlike sense-based desires, does not come 
about as a response to past experiences of pleasure and the expectation of future pleasure. Rather 
than arising from sensible desires, respect arises from the restriction of all sensible desires. Our 
sense-based desires persuade us to formulate maxims that will help us obtain pleasure, but when 
we compare these maxims to the moral law, we realize that the moral law demands that we 
restrain our sense-based desires and limit our maxims. When we restrain our desires in order to 
make our maxims cohere with the moral law, we are filled with respect, which does not motivate 
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us to pursue pleasure but motivates us to resist the sense-based desires that tempt us, and to 
instead determine our wills and actions through the moral law.4  
The following example will shed light on how we gain insight into our ability to restrain our 
sense-based desires when we compare our maxims to the moral law. Imagine that an agent 
named Suzy has a desire for mangoes. She uses her instrumental reason to determine that, since 
she has no money, it is necessary for her to steal a mango from the market in order to satisfy her 
desire. When she reasons in this manner, Suzy only determines what is necessary for her to do if 
she wants to satisfy her desire for mangoes. Thus, she only identifies a subjectively necessary 
action commanded by a hypothetical imperative. However, she can also identify an action that is 
objectively necessary, not just as a means to pleasure, by restraining her desire for mangoes, and 
preventing it from influencing her judgments about what she ought to do. Suzy can recognize 
that the moral law commands her to disregard her desire for mangoes because this desire 
incentivizes her to carry out an action whose maxim that is not universalizable. Though her 
desire for mangoes induces her to adopt the maxim “Steal others’ things if doing so is pleasant or 
beneficial,” she can reject this maxim (and the conception of the good that is at its basis) by 
comparing it to the moral law.5 Furthermore, when she recognizes that she is commanded to 
prevent her desire from determining her actions, she gains insight into her reason’s ability to rule 
over her desires and to determine what she ought to do without instruction from her sense-based 
desires. Since respect is the only feeling that can make the moral law an incentive to action, since 
it must be achieved by restricting all sense-based desires, and since we can only do this when we 
                                                 
4 Kant calls the rational ability to reject and infringe our desires so as to prevent them from determining our wills and 
actions negative freedom. He says that negative freedom is necessary for what he calls positive freedom, the ability to 
determine our will and actions through the exercise of pure practical reason and its apprehension of the moral law. 
5 Kant spells out what it means for agents to recognize that their maxims do not conform to the universal form of the moral 
law in several ways, e.g., by recognizing that they do not will their maxim to become a universal law, or by recognizing that 
acting in accordance with such a maxim would entail treating humanity as a mere means, or by recognizing that the 
proposed maxim does not result from an autonomous act of self-legislation (cf. GMS 4:434-7). 
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compare our maxims to the moral law, we must go through the rational process of comparing our 
maxims to the law in order to be properly motivated to act in accordance with categorical 
imperatives. 
3 MCDOWELL’S ACCOUNT 
In his paper, “Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?” John McDowell 
extrapolates from Thomas Nagel’s arguments for the possibility of altruism in an attempt to 
defend Kant’s doctrine that moral requirements are categorical imperatives (McDowell 1978, 
13). McDowell responds primarily to Philippa Foot’s article “Morality as a System of 
Hypothetical Imperatives” where she argues that the requirements of morality are not categorical 
imperatives because “it is possible, without irrationality, to question whether one has reason to 
conform to them” (McDowell 1978, 13).6  Foot suggests that moral requirements are categorical 
only in the sense that we do not consider agents exempt from them just because they do not 
desire to comply with them. However, she argues that this does not make moral imperatives 
categorical in the sense that Kant and his followers urge. She points out that the requirements of 
etiquette share this characteristic with the requirements of morality, but they do not, in virtue of 
possessing that characteristic, command all rational agents to follow them, on pain of 
irrationality. She thus concludes that moral requirements are no more rationally binding, or 
categorical, than the requirements of etiquette.  
Though McDowell agrees with Foot that a failure to see that one has reasons for acting in 
accordance with moral requirements, and to act accordingly, does not entail a manifestation of 
irrationality on one’s part, he disagrees with the conclusion that Foot derives from this claim. 
                                                 
6 In her book Natural Goodness, Foot retracts the arguments she puts forth in this article. Regardless, I think we can expand 
our understanding of Kant’s doctrine by taking a close look at McDowell’s arguments against Foot’s, now withdrawn, 
argument and conclusion.   
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Namely, McDowell disagrees with the conclusion that moral requirements are hypothetical 
imperatives since they only have an influence on the wills of those who posses certain desires 
upon which the requirements’ authority and influence are conditional.  McDowell argues that 
even if failing to recognize the legitimacy of moral requirements and moral reasons for acting is 
not irrational, moral requirements can still be understood as categorical imperatives in a Kantian 
sense.  
In order to understand McDowell’s defense of Kant, one must first understand the change 
in terminology that McDowell suggests will help us gain a more intuitive understanding of the 
idea that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. McDowell proposes that we understand 
what it means to be commanded by an imperative as equivalent to recognizing that one has 
certain reasons for acting. He suggests that to be commanded by a hypothetical imperative is to 
recognize the legitimacy of prudential reasons for acting, and to be commanded by a categorical 
imperative is to recognize the legitimacy of moral reasons for acting. In other words, an agent is 
commanded to act by categorical imperatives when she recognizes that she has moral reasons for 
acting, and these reasons weigh with her.  
Following Nagel, McDowell suggests that just as agents can recognize prudential reasons 
for acting by simply attending to the facts of their situation, it is also by attending to certain facts 
of their situation that agents recognize moral reasons for acting. According to McDowell, in the 
former case agents are commanded to act by hypothetical imperatives and in the latter case they 
are commanded to act by categorical imperatives. He argues that we can make sense of Kant’s 
theory of moral requirements by appealing to the virtuous agent’s perceptual capacity to form a 
construal of her situation in which she sees certain facts of her situation as reasons for acting. 
When the agent recognizes that these facts give her moral reasons for acting, she sees the actions 
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that such reasons support in a positive light. Thus, it is her cognitive and perceptual capacity to 
recognize facts as reasons for acting that explains the influence that these reasons have on her will. 
The influence that such reasons and requirements have on her will manifests itself as the 
recognition that she is required to will or act in a particular manner, which is not yet the 
motivational influence that actually can lead her to carry out the action commanded. In the case of 
moral requirements, the agent’s possession of a desire for a subjective end that can be produced by 
carrying out the action commanded does not account for the influence that the requirements have 
on the agent’s will (McDowell 1978, 20-21). According to McDowell, this shows that if an agent 
has developed said capacity and has learned to construe situations correctly, or virtuously, her 
construal of the situation will yield “non-hypothetical reasons for acting” (McDowell 1978, 23). 
Thus, he suggests, by appealing to the ordinary capacity possessed by rational agents to construe 
facts as reasons for acting, Kant’s doctrine that moral requirements are categorical imperatives can 
be vindicated.  
McDowell’s proposal is that agents can perceive certain facts of their situation as 
providing reasons for acting and as yielding requirements without having to appeal to some 
preexisting desire of theirs in order for the requirement to get off the ground, or for it to have 
some rational influence on the agents. Hence, he claims, moral requirements are categorical 
imperatives because they are recognized as authoritative, and thus have some rational influence 
on rational agents, regardless of whether the actions they command are “ancillary to the agent’s 
desires or interests” (McDowell 1978, 13).  According to McDowell, his account shows that it is 
not necessary for an agent to possess a desire for the advantageous or pleasant consequences of 
an action in order for her to recognize that she is rationally required to carry out said action. The 
agent’s conception of her situation suffices for her to recognize that she is required to act in a 
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certain manner. Thus, McDowell concludes that, to the contrary of Foot’s arguments, moral 
requirements are categorical imperatives.  
The following example should help clarify the sense in which McDowell thinks moral 
requirements command categorically. Imagine an agent, Amy, whose elderly neighbor is ill and 
needs to be taken to the hospital. Upon recognizing the fact that her neighbor is in need of help, 
Amy recognizes that she has a reason, and is thus required, to help. She recognizes this even 
though she does not have an antecedent desire to help her neighbor or to promote her neighbor’s 
health, a desire that exists prior to, and thus grounds, her recognition of the requirement she is 
subject to. If Amy is virtuous, she will see the facts about her situation as reasons for helping her 
neighbor; she will recognize that she is obligated to help, not because some preexisting, sense-
based desire of hers can be satisfied by helping.  
McDowell suggests that when a reason for acting weighs with a particular agent, this might 
entail that the agent has a desire to act in accordance with that reason. However, though the agent 
acquires a desire to act in accordance with that reason upon recognizing it, this does not entail that 
a desire is prerequisite, or must be presupposed, as a precondition for the reason to be recognized 
by the agent, or for it to have some rational influence on the agent. McDowell maintains that the 
agent’s desire to carry out a virtuous action, “need not function as an independent component in 
the explanation, needed in order to account for the capacity of the cited reason to influence the 
agent’s will”(McDowell 1978, 16; cf. 13-16).7 According to McDowell, if an agent’s desire to act 
is not “independently intelligible” but follows as a consequence of her recognition that she has 
moral reasons for acting in a certain manner, she can be seen as recognizing a requirement that 
applies to her categorically rather than merely conditionally upon her possession of some desire. 
                                                 
7 I take it that for a reason to influence an agent’s will is not yet for it to motivate the agent to action but merely for it to 
exert some rational influence on the agent. That is, for the reason to be recognized as authoritative, as applicable to her.  
14 
Furthermore, McDowell adds that such an agent’s action can be understood as motivated solely by 
her recognition that the facts of her situation provide reasons to act in a certain manner regardless 
of whether so acting will help her satisfy some desire. Therefore, on this picture, an agent’s 
conception of her situation suffices to yield reasons for acting that weigh on her independently of 
any sense-based desires she might have, and such a conception also suffices to motivate the agent 
to carry out the action that is categorically commanded.  
Since McDowell’s account rests on an analogy between the recognition of prudential and 
moral reasons for acting, he must distinguish between the two types of reasons in order to argue 
that when agents recognize prudential reasons they are commanded by hypothetical imperatives, 
but when they recognize moral reasons they are commanded by categorical imperatives; and that 
the latter are importantly different from the former. He does this by arguing that prudential and 
moral reasons, respectively, exert a different rational influence on agents. According to McDowell, 
categorical imperatives exert a rational influence on the agent that silences the rational influence 
exerted by hypothetical imperatives. In other words, categorical imperatives differ from 
hypothetical imperatives in that the reasons yielded by the former are incommensurable with the 
reasons provided by the latter. Moral reasons do not outweigh non-moral reasons, but they rather 
undermine the authority and motivational influence of non-moral reasons. Thus, McDowell 
suggests that the agent who properly recognizes moral reasons for acting as categorical imperatives 
will not be swayed by non-moral concerns, and will not struggle against the motivational and 
psychological influence of her inclinations.8 In order to illustrate his point, McDowell draws from 
Aristotle’s distinction between the virtuous agent’s motivation to carry out virtuous actions and 
                                                 
8 Kant defines inclination as “The dependence of the faculty of desire upon feelings,” which “always indicates a 
need”(GMS 4:414) 
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that of the continent agent. He suggests that the agent who is motivated by a categorical imperative 
will not struggle against her inclinations in the manner in which the merely continent agent does 
because the categorical imperative presents the truly virtuous agent with reasons that silence non-
moral desires and concerns.   
4 SENSIBLE EXPERIENCE VS. THE MORAL LAW      
Throughout his practical works, Kant argues that categorical imperatives are practical 
principles that contain objective necessity. He also argues that principles that contain objective 
necessity cannot be derived from experience. In this section, I spell out Kant’s arguments for the 
idea that principles that constitute categorical imperatives must have objective necessity, and 
explain Kant’s reasons for believing that such principles, which he also calls practical laws, 
cannot be derived from, or grounded in, experience. I then argue that McDowell’s account of 
how moral commands can be categorical imperative is at odds with the aforementioned claims, 
and is thus an inadequate defense of Kant’s doctrine.  
 In the Second Critique Kant draws a distinction between principles that constitute 
hypothetical imperatives and principles that constitute categorical imperatives. He identifies the 
difference between the two kinds of imperatives as stemming from the kind of necessity that they 
contain, respectively. He argues that practical principles that contain mere subjective necessity 
are hypothetical imperatives and those that contain objective necessity are categorical 
imperatives. Practical principles that contain objective or “absolute necessity” (MM 6:389) are 
practical laws and, Kant explains, only practical laws can ground or constitute categorical 
imperatives. He argues that only practical principles that contain objective necessity command 
categorically because practical principles that lack objective necessity determine the will “only 
with respect to a desired effect,” not “the will as will”(KpV 5:20).  
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When Kant says that certain principles only determine the will with respect to some 
desired effect, he means that practical principles that lack objective or absolute necessity only 
tell a rational agent what she should do if she desires some effect that can be produced by 
performing the action recommended by the principle in question. So, Kant explains, practical 
principles that lack objective necessity are not imperatives or commands in the strict sense of the 
word; they are more like counsels of reason, or rules of skill, than inexorable commands (GMS 
4:416-417).9 In the Groundwork, Kant explains,  
“Giving counsel does involve necessity, which, however, can hold only under a 
subjective and contingent condition, whether this or that man counts this or that in his 
happiness;” (GMS 4:416)  
 
Mere practical principles, unlike practical laws, only identify actions that are necessary to 
carry out if the agent has a particular goal or end that can satisfy her sense-based desires if 
promoted by means of implementing the principles in question. Furthermore, since the agent is 
under no obligation to promote ends that would satisfy her subjective desires, she merely wants 
to do so, the principle does not obligate her to perform a particular action tout court.  Rather, the 
agent can permissibly reject the principle’s command, or exempt herself from the obligation that 
the principle places over her, by simply giving up the relevant goals or desires upon which the 
imperative’s rational authority is conditional (GMS 4:419-420).  
Hypothetical imperatives express the rational principle that whoever wills, or desires, 
some end, also wills the means to this end. These imperatives presuppose that the agent wills 
some end and assert that she must also will the conduct that is a means to this end. They identify 
                                                 
9 Kant draws a distinction between imperatives of skill and imperatives of prudence, saying that the latter are mere 
counsels because happiness as an end cannot be made determinate (GMS 4:419). However, both of these imperatives lack 
objective necessity, and the distinctions between the two are not important for the purposes of this paper. 
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some conduct as necessary only for those who have adopted a particular end, since the 
imperative can only deem an action necessary if it presupposes that some end seems good to, or 
is desired by, the agent. Thus, reason does not inexorably require all agents to act in accordance 
with principles that lack objective necessity, and this is why they only yield or constitute 
hypothetical imperatives, the authority of which is conditional on desires for discretionary ends 
that the agent can rationally and permissibly renounce. Through subjective practical principles, 
reason deems that an agent who is to remain rational and who truly wills some end, must also 
will, and endeavor to bring about, the means. However, by means of such principles reason does 
not deem that the action itself, or the end to which it is a means, is good. Therefore, an agent 
cannot recognize an action as itself necessary or genuinely obligatory by appealing to such 
principles.  
After arguing that only principles that obtain objective necessity can command 
categorically, Kant argues that these kinds of principles cannot be derived from experience. 
According to Kant, principles that are grounded on empirical concepts of the good, or in 
experience, can only contain subjective necessity. This means that principles that are derived 
from experience can only be hypothetical imperatives. Since principles derived from experience 
lack objective necessity, they cannot ground or express the sort of obligation that genuine moral 
requirements express. Thus, Kant argues that the ground of obligation must be sought “a priori 
simply in concepts of pure reason” and not in “the circumstances of the world” (GMS 4:389). He 
concludes that moral laws and their principles must be free of anything empirical which would 
obliterate their objective necessity and their categorical nature.  
Kant’s reasoning for thinking that practical laws cannot be derived from experience can 
be found in the second Critique, where he argues that there are only two ways in which we can 
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determine what we ought to do, or two ways in which we can determine what ends we ought to 
promote. Kant says that we can determine what ends we ought to promote by either appealing to 
practical laws, or by appealing to concepts of the good derived from experience and formulating 
practical principles on the basis of such concepts (KpV 5:57-58). Kant argues that if we appeal to 
experience in order to identify which ends are good, or which practical principles we ought to 
adopt, our wills and actions will be determined by our desire for pleasure and not by our rational 
apprehension of what is truly good. That is, we will adopt principles based on what we desire to 
do, for the sake of pleasure, rather than adopting principles based on what reason tells us is good, 
or what we ought to do.  
Moreover, according to Kant, only principles that contain subjective necessity can be 
derived from experience because principles derived from experience are based on a conception 
of the good as that which is associated with pleasure. He claims that when agents appeal to 
experience in order to formulate and adopt practical principles, they are restricted to using 
empirical concepts of the good as the basis of the principles they formulate and adopt. He argues 
that, on the other hand, when we appeal to practical laws, we can identify a concept of the good 
that is objective and accurately tracks objectively good ends and actions. However, when, instead 
of appealing to practical laws, we appeal to experience in order to acquire a concept of the good, 
we will only be able to identify a concept of the good that is subjectively valid. A concept of the 
good is merely subjectively valid when it tracks only those things that have pleased a particular 
agent in the past and, thus, are deemed likely to bring her pleasure in the future. In experience, 
only those things that are associated with pleasure (through a process of induction from past 
experiences) are represented as good, and those that are associated with pain are represented as 
bad. That is why, when we turn to experience in order to derive a concept of the good, we are 
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bound to identify as good only what is merely pleasant, or subjectively good, and not what is 
objectively good.  
 Furthermore, when we go about formulating and adopting practical principles by first 
deriving a concept of the good from experience, and basing the principles we formulate on such 
a concept, we can only come up with practical principles that tell us what to do in order to satisfy 
our desire for pleasure and our aversion to pain. Thus, Kant says,  
“If the concept of good is not to be derived from an antecedent practical law but is 
rather to serve as its basis, then it can only be the concept of something whose existence 
promises pleasure and thus determines the causality of the subject to produce this 
something” (KpV 5:58). 
 
The following example should help illustrate what Kant has in mind in this passage. 
Imagine an agent who turns to her experience in order to formulate a conception of the good. 
Since she appeals to experience, she does not make use of a previously formulated rational 
principle that sets out certain criteria for what counts as good. Therefore, she can only rely on her 
past experience of pleasure as an indicator that is meant to track goodness. By appealing to her 
past experience of pleasure, she might, for example, identify eating chocolate cake as good, or as 
something to be pursued and promoted. Once she has identified eating chocolate cake as good, 
she can use that concept in order to ground a practical principle that has that concept of the good 
at its basis.  In other words, she can formulate and adopt a practical principle that follows from 
the presupposition that eating chocolate cake is good. The practical principle follows from the 
presupposition that eating chocolate cake is good in that it identifies an action that is a means to 
promoting that good, and asserts that if the agent wills the end, she must will the means 
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identified by the principle. If she proceeds in the manner described, she will come up with a 
principle that has mere subjective necessity because the principle is only thought to be valid for 
the agent under the assumption that some subjective condition holds, i.e. having a desire for 
chocolate cake, and that satisfying that desire is a good thing. For example, her empirical 
conception of the good might serve as the basis for the practical principle, “Do whatever is 
necessary in order to obtain and consume as much chocolate cake as possible.” This practical 
principle is grounded in, and follows from, her assumption that eating chocolate cake is good, 
and that this activity, being good, should be promoted. However, the principle only has 
subjective validity because it only tells the agent what she should do in order to satisfy her 
particular desires. In other words, this is not a principle that is necessary for all rational beings to 
adopt, but only for those who will to increase their pleasure by eating chocolate cake, and can do 
so without violating the moral law. 
 Any agent, including the one in our example, can dismiss the principle’s commands, 
since eating chocolate cake is not an objectively good activity that must be promoted on pain of 
irrationality, but is merely a pleasant activity that is promoted only for the sake of pleasure. 
When reasoning in the manner described above, from empirical concepts of the good to practical 
principles, agents formulate and adopt practical principles that do not determine what is 
objectively good for them to do, but rather instruct them as to how best to obtain something that 
is already assumed to be good because it is associated with pleasure. The example illustrates 
Kant’s belief that, practical principles derived from experience cannot tell agents what they are 
under obligation to do as rational beings, in which case they would contain objective necessity. 
Thus, if an agent were to identify what she is required to do by appealing to the facts of her 
situation, in the manner suggested by McDowell, she would only be able to identify hypothetical, 
21 
not categorical, requirements. In other words, agents cannot discover moral requirements by 
appealing to experience.10 
According to Kant, agents should only appeal to experience in order to identify specific 
actions and material principles that conform to the form of the moral law and the formal 
principles of the will that are grounded in it. Once an agent has recognized the objective 
goodness, and thus objective necessity, of limiting her maxims so that they conform to the moral 
law, she can, and should, look to empirical facts in order to determine the particular action 
through which she can fulfill her duty. Kant argues that we should derive moral requirements 
from pure practical reason and only appeal to experience in order to make these requirements 
“effective in concreto the conduct of [our] life” (GMS 4:389). In other words, agents must derive 
categorical imperatives from the moral law alone by recognizing the objective necessity of 
certain formal, a priori principles of the will. Once they recognize the objective necessity of such 
principles, they can appeal to experience in order to identify particular actions that are 
compatible with the formal principles of the will from which the agent derived the moral 
requirements proper.  
For example, when an agent sees that her friend is hungry, she might recognize a moral 
requirement to share some food with her friend. However, she cannot look to the facts of her 
situation in order to identify this requirement if she is to recognize it as a categorical imperative. 
This is so because the facts of her situation, e.g. that her friend is hungry, that her friend will no 
longer be hungry if she feeds her, do not themselves yield principles that place her under a moral 
obligation to give her friend food. Her experience of these facts only yields a principle that is 
based on the presupposition that it is good to eliminate her friend’s hunger, and that feeding her 
                                                 
10 Though the question of how an agent is motivated to act in accordance with duty is different from the question of how 
an agent recognizes her duty, Kant suggests that in order to be motivated by duty, an agent must first be conscious that 
she has a duty to act.  
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friend is good and necessary because doing so is a means to promoting the end that is presumed 
to be good. Such a principle only contains subjective necessity because the action it commands is 
deemed good as a means to some other end that is presupposed to be good (because it has been 
associated with pleasure in past experience).  
In order to recognize an action as objectively good and necessary, an agent must look to 
the principle from which the action follows, not to the effects that the action can produce.  If an 
agent bases her practical principles on the presupposition that it would be good to bring some 
effect about, she will only recognize what she ought to do in order to satisfy her desire for that 
effect, not what she ought to do in order to comply with what morality requires. Thus, in 
recognizing the authority of principles grounded in experience, the agent will not recognize 
moral requirements that command categorically but mere requirements of skill or prudence that 
command hypothetically.  
Now, in many cases where an agent recognizes that she must carry out some action for 
the sake of satisfying her desire for pleasure, it is clear that she does not recognize an imperative 
that is categorical. For example, it should now be obvious that the requirement “Do whatever is 
possible to eat more chocolate cake,” when it is based on an agent’s desire for chocolate cake 
and her belief that following this principle will bring her pleasure, is not a categorical imperative. 
However, it might not seem equally obvious that the requirement “feed your friend,” when it is 
based on the agent’s understanding that it would be good if her friend ceased to be hungry, and 
that she can bring this effect about by feeding her, is not a moral requirement that commands 
categorically. In other words, some might find it difficult to accept that an imperative that 
commands a seemingly virtuous and altruistic action could fail to be a moral requirement simply 
because it is based on material derived from experience. Someone who is swayed by this worry 
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might argue that Kant is not committed to the strong, and seemingly implausible, claim that all 
principles grounded on material drawn from experience fail to be categorical imperatives or 
moral requirements. This person might thus argue that Kant’s claim that empirical material, i.e. 
material derived from experience, cannot serve as the basis of practical laws is much weaker than 
I have made it out to be. Accordingly, the objection would urge that Kant did not mean that all 
experience and empirical facts are unfit to ground practical laws or moral requirements. Rather, 
according to the objection, Kant only holds the weaker claim according to which empirical 
concepts that equate the good to the satisfaction of the agent’s selfish desire for pleasure cannot 
serve as the basis of practical laws or categorical imperatives. In other words, not all empirical 
facts or concepts are barred from grounding moral requirements, but only those that represent as 
good only ends that are expected to produce the most pleasure for the agent while injuring or 
disadvantaging others.  
If the objection holds, my arguments against McDowell could be seen as resulting from 
an uncharitable reading of his account. After all, McDowell does not suggest that the facts that 
yield moral requirements are facts about what will bring about the most pleasure for the agent. 
Instead, McDowell suggests that the relevant facts have nothing to do with what will help the 
agent satisfy her desire for pleasure. For example, McDowell might have in mind a situation in 
which an agent recognizes that her friend is hungry and see this fact as yielding a categorical 
imperative to help her friend by giving her food. In the example I put forth on behalf of 
McDowell, the fact that the agent’s friend is hungry yields an imperative that does not, in any 
obvious way, depend on the thought that the agent can satisfy her desires by feeding her friend. 
Thus, the principle she derives from experience does not seem to be a recipe for bringing about 
some pleasant state of affairs and satisfying her desires. In other words, though the agent looks to 
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her experience in order to formulate and adopt this principle, it seems as though the principle 
does not tell the agent what to do if she desires to bring something pleasant about, but it rather 
tells her what she must do regardless of what she desires to do. It thus seems as though 
McDowell could be right in arguing that such principles, though derived from experience, 
qualify as a categorical imperatives. 
However, I think the aforementioned objection can be dismissed if we better understand 
Kant’s reasons for rejecting all empirical material from serving as the basis of practical laws, i.e. 
categorical imperatives. Once we do this, it will become clear that Kant holds the stronger claim 
according to which no empirical material is fit to ground categorical imperatives, not the weaker 
claim that the objection urges. In order to see why Kant holds the stronger claim, we must 
understand why he thinks that even seemingly moral principles fail to be categorical imperatives 
when they are grounded on material taken from experience.  
Kant argues that whatever appears good to an agent in her experience of the sensible 
world does so in virtue of the fact that her particular experiences have generated certain sense-
based desires in her. That is to say, agents experience objects or states of affairs as good because 
experience has shaped each agent’s sensibilities in a way that certain objects and states of affairs 
are associated with pleasure in the agents mind, and are expected to produce pleasure in the 
agent if obtained. These sense-based desires make it so that the agent perceives certain ends and 
objects as good through her experience of the sensible world. This explains why different agents 
are pleased by different things, and are motivated to pursue different ends. Moreover, these 
objects and ends don’t appear good because they are in fact good, but only because they satisfy 
the agent’s sense-based desires. Accordingly, when we turn to experience in order to identify 
some good end which to pursue by means of rational principles, we cannot identify or track 
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objectively good ends.  Rather, what we identify as good in experience is merely that which we 
desire because, since we have sense-based desires for things of its ilk, it pleases us and strikes 
our sensibilities as good.  
Furthermore, when sensible beings like us appeal to experience in order to identify a 
concept of the good, we use this concept as a foundation, or basis, from which to derive practical 
principles. In doing so, we mistakenly presuppose that the end desired is good, and we formulate 
a practical principle that recommends an action as a means of bringing it about. We thus see this 
practical principle as valid and as having authority over us because it can help us bring about the 
end that we expect will satisfy our sense-based desires.  
As we can see from the aforementioned observations, practical principles that are 
grounded on experience cannot constitute categorical imperatives for at least two reasons. First, 
these principles do not apply to all agents but only to those who have sense-based desires that 
can be satisfied by means of the action the principle commands. Second, agents who recognize 
that these principles apply to them see the principles as commanding an action as a means to 
some further end. This means that they do not see the action commanded as required by the 
moral law (as a duty), but they rather see it as a recommended means to satisfying their desires 
(KpV 5:26). These principles are counsels of prudence generated by reason following her sense-
based desires’ directions, not commands of pure practical reason.  
Furthermore, even if everyone desired the ends that principles derived from experience 
promote, these principles would still fail to have the authority required in order to command 
categorically (KpV 5:26). This is so because principles grounded on experience are grounded on 
the natural principle of self-love, even if they have at their basis a universally shared empirical 
concept of the good. By means of the principle of self-love, nature urges us to satisfy our desires, 
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and to adopt principles that are conducive to pleasure. However, the principle of self-love is not a 
law of reason that we give ourselves. Therefore, when we act in accordance with the principle of 
self-love, or the practical principles grounded on the principle of self-love, we cannot command 
ourselves to act but are rather compelled to act by the laws of nature.  When we act in 
accordance with the laws of nature, we do not determine our actions in accordance with what 
reason deems ought to be done. Rather, when guided by the laws of nature, we are compelled to 
act by forces external to our reason that cannot command us in a categorical fashion (cf. KpV 
5:33 on autonomy of the will and heteronomy of choice).  
Thus, Kant does not think that grounding one’s practical principles in experience is 
objectionable because we thereby carry out actions that are stereotypically evil, or adopt ends 
that benefit us (the agents) at the expense of hurting others (as could be the case with the end 
“chocolate cake” and the corresponding principle “Do whatever it takes to eat chocolate cake”). 
Rather, Kant thinks that grounding practical principles on experience is objectionable even if the 
end we adopt happens to be genuinely good, and the principle we formulate on the basis of such 
an end accords with the moral law (as could be the case with the principle “Feed my friends 
when they are hungry”). Kant thinks that grounding practical principles in experience is 
objectionable because appealing to experience prevents us from formulating principles that are 
universal, and thus prevents us from recognizing that the principle’s validity and authority over 
us stems from the fact that it is valid for all rational beings, regardless of which effects 
implementing it might bring about. If a principle is to command categorically, it must identify an 
action as necessary in itself (not just as a means), and the agent must recognize that the principle 
is valid in virtue of the fact that it has the form of the moral law, or that its form is universally 
valid because it is valid for all beings who have reason and a will (KpV 5:26). When we ground 
27 
principle on experience we recognize the principle that we thereby formulate as valid in virtue of 
the good effects it can bring about for us and for others, and this prevents us from recognizing 
these principles as valid in virtue of their universality. Furthermore, Kant also thinks that when 
we ground principles on experience, we are caused to act by forces external to our reason. Thus, 
when we ground practical principles in experience, our desire for pleasure compels us to act and 
this prevents us from commanding ourselves (categorically) to act in accordance with moral 
requirements.   
We can now see why Kant would deny that the agent who grounds the principle “I should 
feed my friend” in her experience of the facts of her situation recognizes and acts in accordance 
with a categorical imperative. From the presupposition that eliminating her friend’s hunger is 
good, the agent derives a principle that tells her how to bring about the state of affairs in which 
her friend is no longer hungry. She can thereby recognize a requirement to feed her friend. 
However, she will recognize the action of feeding her friend as a necessary means to bringing 
about a product that she presumed to be good. She will not recognize the action as necessary 
because it is what the principles of pure practical reason command. She will only see the action 
as necessary if she wants to bring about a certain product without having determined whether 
reason actually deems the principle good in itself, and whether it commands that all rational 
agents adopt it. Thus, contra the objection, Kant holds the stronger claim that no material derived 
from experience can serve as the basis of practical laws, regardless of whether the principles 
grounded on such material promote the happiness of others and command actions that accord 
with the moral law.  
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5 SILENCING NON-MORAL CONCERNS AND VIRTUE AS STRENGTH 
In this section I turn to McDowell’s suggestion that moral requirements are categorical 
imperatives in the sense that they give rise to reasons that silence all other non-moral reasons and 
concerns. I argue that the silencing metaphor McDowell employs is misleading and flies in the 
face of central aspects of Kant’s moral theory, specially Kant’s theory of virtue as the strength of 
an agent’s maxim in fulfilling her duty against the resistance of inclinations. I argue that, contra 
McDowell, Kant does not think of virtue as a perceptual capacity that enables agents to identify 
moral requirements and abide by them without struggling against their non-moral desires. I 
conclude that this tension between McDowell’s account an Kant’s theory constitutes a further 
reason for rejecting McDowell’s account as a proper defense of Kant’s doctrine that moral 
requirements are categorical imperatives.    
As we saw in previous sections, McDowell argues that just as an agent can construe the 
facts of her situation as constituting prudential reasons for acting, so can she construe the facts of 
her situation as constituting moral reasons for acting. Furthermore, McDowell argues, the mere 
recognition of either type of reasons is sufficient to motivate the agent to act. Following Nagel 
(Nagel, 1989), McDowell draws an analogy between moral and non-moral reasons in order to 
argue that the recognition of moral requirements like the recognition of prudential requirements, 
both expressed in reasons for acting, can sufficiently motivate agents. However, having drawn 
the analogy between prudential and moral reasons, McDowell must then distinguish between the 
two types of reasons in order to account for how moral reasons command categorically whereas 
prudential reasons command only hypothetically. That is, he must find a way to explain why 
moral reasons express categorical imperatives whereas prudential reasons, though they do not 
depend on subjective desires in order to motivate agents, express mere hypothetical imperatives. 
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In order to account for this vital difference, McDowell makes use of a metaphor according to 
which moral reasons have the ability to silence non-moral reasons, arguing that it is in this sense 
that moral reasons, as opposed to non-moral reasons, command categorically.  
In order to spell out the silencing metaphor, McDowell appeals to Aristotle’s distinction 
between the virtuous and the merely continent agents. Aristotle famously argues for the idea, 
taken up by many contemporary virtue ethicists, that the truly virtuous agent will have aligned 
his emotions and desires with his rational apprehension of the good (Nicomachean Ethics 
1120b14-28).  According to Aristotle, the virtuous agent differs from the merely continent agent 
in that the former’s emotions and desires are in complete agreement with her practical reason. 
When the virtuous agent determines that some action is virtuous, through the exercise of 
practical reason, her emotions and desires will be in agreement with her reason’s dictates, and 
they will thus prompt her to act virtuously. Therefore, if an agent is truly virtuous, her emotions 
and desires will not tempt her to act against what virtue requires, and she will perform virtuous 
actions without facing inner struggle or resistance.11 Furthermore, if an agent’s emotions and 
desires prompt her to act in a manner contrary to virtue, and she is able to perform virtuous 
actions only by exercising self-control and combating her non-moral desires, she is not virtuous 
but merely continent. 
 When applying the silencing metaphor to Kant’s theory, McDowell argues that Kant, 
like Aristotle, thinks that an agent’s action fails to be morally good if she must struggle against 
her inclinations, and other non-moral desires, in order to carry out the action that morality 
requires (McDowell, 27). According to McDowell, Kant maintains that if an agent should 
struggle against her inclinations in order to carry out an action required by the moral law, she is 
                                                 
11 Margaret Baxley presents an excellent discussion of Aristotle’s idea and Kant’s disagreement with this idea in her book 
Kant’s Theory of Virtue (Baxley 2010, 40-46). 
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not motivated by a categorical imperative and her motivation is not moral. McDowell suggests 
that the agent who is properly motivated by moral reasons, having recognized the authority of a 
categorical imperative, will not have to fight her inclinations, but will focus solely on the duty 
that arises from the moral requirement, disregarding all her other non-moral desires and 
concerns. Furthermore, he argues that the agent does this by exercising her virtue. By attributing 
this view to Kant, McDowell suggests that reasons that represent categorical imperatives 
eliminate any resistance against the agent’s moral motivation to act, and it is this feature that 
makes the moral requirements they represent categorical rather than hypothetical. However, as 
we shall see below, Kant’s conception of virtue is decidedly at odds with the views McDowell 
attributes to him. 
In order to understand why McDowell is mistaken in suggesting that moral reasons for 
acting silence non-moral desires and concerns, it will be helpful to follow Margaret Baxley in 
drawing a distinction between the will’s legislative and executive powers. In doing so, we shall 
see that whereas non-moral desires and concerns are silent when agents legislates practical laws, 
they are not silent, as McDowell suggests, when agents apply these laws in action. As Baxley 
points out in her book Kant’s Theory of Virtue, since we are rational agents, our wills have a 
legislative power to formulate and establish practical principles that express the requirements set 
out by the moral law. In other words, as rational agents we can discover and command ourselves 
to follow practical principles that tell us what the moral law requires of us and all other rational 
agents. In formulating such principles, we look only to the moral law and the standards it sets out 
for universal validity. Therefore, according to Kant, non-moral desires and concerns, being 
empirical conditions (cf. KpV 5:41, 47; GMS 4:444), play no part in determining which practical 
principles morality requires us to legislate (KpV 5:30). For example, my desire for money and 
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the pleasure I derive from it has no bearing on whether a principle that commands me to steal my 
friend’s money so that I can satisfy my desires is a practical law, or a practical principle that the 
moral law deems valid for all rational beings. Thus, if McDowell meant his metaphor to apply 
only with respect to the will’s legislative function, he would be right to suggest that non-moral 
desires and concerns are silent when we determine which principles morality requires us to adopt 
(McDowell, 26-28). However, as we shall see, McDowell mistakenly applies his metaphor to the 
executive function of the will, and thereby gets Kant’s theory wrong. 
When McDowell claims that categorical imperatives silence sensible desires and non-
moral concerns, he means to suggest that non-moral desires and concerns are motivationally 
silent when agents put into practice the practical principles they have previously legislated, i.e. 
when the will exercises its executive power. The will exercises its executive power when agents 
motivate themselves to act in accordance with practical laws and put these laws into practice. 
Thus, according to McDowell, the silencing metaphor applies when the will exercises its 
executive power. That is, according to McDowell, non-moral desires and concerns do not affect 
the virtuous agent when she puts practical laws into practice and motivates herself to act in 
accordance with moral requirements. McDowell argues that if an agent truly apprehends moral 
reasons for acting, and is properly motivated by these reasons, non-moral desires will not exert 
any motivational force on her when she chooses to apply a practical law by carrying out a 
particular morally worthy action. Accordingly, McDowell argues that Kant’s virtuous agent 
complies with moral commands without struggling against her inclinations, if her motivation is 
moral (McDowell, 28). However, though non-moral desires and concerns are silent in regards to 
an agent’s formulation and legislation of practical laws, they are not silent when the agent puts 
these laws into practice by choosing to carry out particular virtuous actions.  
32 
Kant disagree vehemently with the suggestion put forth by McDowell when he argues 
that, though the legislation of practical laws only entails autonomy of practical reason, the 
application of such laws in action also entails autocracy of practical reason (MM 6:383). 
Autocracy, for Kant, differs from mere autonomy because it not only requires that practical 
reason be free from the influence of sensible desires, but it also requires that practical reason rule 
over such desires when motivating the agent to act in accordance with practical laws. In other 
words, reason is autonomous because it does not depend on sensible desires in order to determine 
what ought to be done, but it is autocratic because it also overcomes the obstacles that the 
inclinations place in its path when they tempt the agent to violate its dictates. Autocracy entails 
an active constrain of sense-based desires that comes about through inner-struggle. In explaining 
why human beings need autocracy of practical reason, Kant argues that humans do not have a 
holy will but only a finite rational will (RGV 6:380). Thus, because finitely rational beings like 
us cannot rid ourselves of the sensible desires and inclinations that prompt us to deviate from the 
moral law, we need to actively restrict and rule our sense-based desires through the exercise of 
our practical reason. Therefore, in order for us to comply with the moral law, we must not only 
legislate practical principles through the free exercise of our reason, we must also exercise self-
governance so as to rule over our sensible desires (that are constant sources of resistance and 
inner struggle) and subjugate them to our reason (KpV 5:83-4).  
In spelling out what finite rational beings must do in order to act in accordance with the 
moral law, Kant ties the notion of autocracy to his conception of virtue (MM 6:383). Kant defines 
virtue as the “strength of a human being’s maxim in fulfilling his duty” (MM 6:394), arguing that 
virtue is strength in overcoming the opposition of one’s natural inclinations. According to Kant, 
holy beings whose wills naturally conform to the moral law do not need virtue in order to act or 
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will in accordance with the moral law. However, finite rational beings like us do need virtue in 
order to fight and dominate the sensible desires that compel us to violate the moral law. In other 
words, it is not sufficient for finite rational beings to recognize moral requirements or to legislate 
practical laws if we want to act in accordance with these requirements. In addition to recognizing 
moral requirements and legislating practical laws through the free exercise of our reason, we must 
also exercise strength of will, or virtue, so as to fight the desires that, even after acknowledging the 
legitimacy and validity of the moral law, still tempt us to violate it.   
As we can now see, Kant’s views on moral motivation and virtue stand in direct conflict 
with McDowell’s argument that the virtuous person does not face resistance from her non-moral 
concerns and desires when she is motivated to act by her recognition of categorical imperatives. 
McDowell conceives of virtue as a capacity to identify and carry out virtuous actions without 
facing inner conflict or resistance. However, McDowell’s conception of virtue is at odds with 
Kant’s own, according to which inner-conflict is unavoidable when a finite rational being is 
motivated to act in accordance with and for the sake of the moral law.12  Thus, according to Kant, 
virtue does not make agents impervious to their desires for pleasure and happiness when these run 
contrary to what the moral law commands, as they usually do. Virtue does not, as it were, replace 
                                                 
12 In the Metaphysics, Kant explains that finite rational beings, unlike holy beings, must rely on virtue to act in 
accordance with the moral law because our sensible desires rebel against morality. He writes, “For finite holy beings (who 
could never be tempted to violate duty) there would be no doctrine of virtue but only a doctrine of morals, since the latter is 
autonomy of practical reason whereas the former is also autocracy of practical reason, that is, it involves consciousness of the 
capacity to master one's inclinations when they rebel against the law…” Furthermore, he concludes “Thus human morality in 
its highest stage can still be nothing more than virtue, even if it be entirely pure (quite free from the influence of any 
incentive other than that of duty). (MM 6:383) 
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an agent’s non-moral desires with a desire, or unimpeded motivation, to act in accordance with the 
moral law. 
 There is further reason why Kant does not hold the view that McDowell attributes to him. 
Virtue, according to Kant, cannot replace non-moral desires with a desire to act in accordance with 
the moral law that eliminates all other desires to act otherwise. This is so because such a desire 
would prevent the agent from subjecting herself to the law and recognizing its commands as 
obligatory rather than as preferred. Thus, Kant writes,  
“…all the moral perfection that a human being can attain is still only virtue, that 
is, a disposition conformed with law from respect for law, and thus consciousness of a 
continuing propensity to transgression or at least impurity, that is, an admixture of many 
spurious (not moral) motives to observe the law” (KpV 5:128).  
 
In this and other passages, Kant explains that human beings cannot love the moral law and 
acquire a desire to act in accordance with its mandates. Rather, the greatest moral perfection that 
human beings can achieve is a disposition to act in accordance with the law from respect.  
Kant explains that respect is an a priori feeling that involves the awareness that other 
motives threaten to tempt us into deviating from the law. That is, moral motivation, for human 
beings, depends on respect for the moral law “which is linked with fear or at least worry about 
transgressing it”(KpV 5:82). This suggests that in order for the moral law to serve as the incentive 
to action, the agent must be sharply aware that her inclinations pose a threat to the moral worth of 
her actions because they may lead her to act against the dictates of the moral law.  As was 
discussed above, according to Kant, the representation of the moral law makes the virtuous agent 
keenly aware of her non-moral desires, so she recognizes that she must and can restrain these 
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desires, lest they lead her to transgress the law. The virtuous agent sees moral requirements as 
obligating her, and enabling her, to restrict her inclinations by limiting her maxims. According to 
the picture put forth by Kant, the agent’s non-moral desires to indulge her inclinations are very 
much the object of the agent’s attention when she motivates herself to act in accordance with the 
law.  
Furthermore, it is important for Kant that virtue presents us with the dignified and 
respectable ability to rule over ourselves. The ability to rule over our self-wrought inclinations 
makes us aware of the dignity that we posses as beings endowed with reason. Our dignity presents 
us with a sense of inner worth that enables us to act virtuously from respect for the law and the 
worth it assigns to us rather than doing so from a sense-based desire for the pleasure that so acting 
can bring about. Thus, virtue is not incompatible with the struggle to rule one’s inclinations. 
Rather, the virtuous person will constantly fight inclinations so that the maxims she puts into 
practice progressively approach the form of the moral law (KpV 5:33). Furthermore, this struggle 
is crucial in the agent’s moral development since she will be empowered by her reason’s ability to 
rule over her sensible desires, and she will better appreciate the worth that she assigns herself 
when she acts in accordance with the moral law. 
6  MORAL MOTIVATION: RESPECT FOR THE MORAL LAW 
In the last section I argued that McDowell’s account of moral motivation flies in the face of 
Kant’s own, in which inner-struggle plays a central role. In this section, I highlight yet another way 
in which McDowell’s account of moral motivation is at odds with Kant’s own. I point out that 
when Kant turns to the question of how moral requirements motivate agents, he argues that moral 
requirements must motivate human beings by means of an incentive. In so arguing, Kant appeals to 
the moral feeling of respect, the feeling through which the law becomes the incentive for action 
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and the subjective determining grounds of the will. The role Kant attributes to the moral feeling of 
respect in moral motivation cuts against McDowell’s idea that human beings are motivated to act 
virtuously by simply recognizing moral reasons for acting. Furthermore, by way of responding to a 
possible objection, I also argue that Kant disagrees with McDowell’s claim that the recognition of 
moral requirements instills in agents a desire for the action that the requirements command them to 
perform.  
 In the second Critique, in the chapter entitled “On the Incentives of Pure Practical Reason,” 
Kant says that all sensible beings need incentives in order to be motivated to act (KpV 5:72). 
Therefore, human beings, having both a rational and a sensible nature, must make use of incentives 
even when they are motivated to act by moral requirements. However, sense-based desires cannot 
be the incentives that motivate agents to act in accordance with the moral law because these 
desires and inclinations aim towards our own happiness and are quintessentially self-interested or 
self-regarding, prompting us to act in accordance with the principle of self-love (KpV 5:73). Thus, 
when motivated by sense-based desires, we act for the sake of pleasure, we are driven by the 
principle of self-love, and our actions fail to have moral worth.  
Kant argues that if morality is possible for human beings, it must be possible for a law to 
directly determine the will, without using a mere feeling as a means of determination. In other 
words, human beings must be able to determine themselves to act in accordance with practical 
laws without being motivated by the promise of pleasure or benefit that can be reaped by acting in 
accordance with such principles. This means that we must be able to make use of some incentive 
that, unlike sense-based desires, does not motivate through the expectation of future pleasure. 
Though, Kant argues, it is beyond human reason to discover how it is possible for a law to directly 
determine the will (KpV 5:72), he claims that we can gain insight into the will’s capacity to be 
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determined by laws alone if we look to the effects that the moral law has on our faculty of desire. 
He argues that we gain insight into the moral law’s ability to directly determine the will when we 
detect that our sensible desires and inclinations can be completely constrained by our rational 
representation of the moral law. That is, we know that the moral law can determine our will 
because we feel respect for the law when our reason represents it and this feeling is the effect 
produces when our reason inhibits our desires and inclinations from determining our will and our 
actions. Thus, the feeling of respect is the effect of the law on our faculty of desire and it enables 
the law to serves as the sole incentive to action and as the subjective determining ground of the 
will without using any sensible feeling as a means of determination.  
 Kant’s discussion of incentives and the feeling of respect seems to suggest that, since we 
are sensible beings, we cannot be motivated to act virtuously by simply recognizing that we have a 
reason for acting, or by recognizing that the moral law places requirements on us. Rather, we need 
to use the moral law as an incentive through the a priori feeling of respect that gives the law 
influence on the will and enables us to adopt and act in accordance with practical laws (KpV 5:72). 
When agents recognize moral requirements, or moral reasons for acting, but do not carry out the 
actions required from respect for the law and the dignified status that it gives them as rational 
beings capable of ruling over their sensible desires and inclinations, they are not actually motivated 
by the law. Furthermore, since agents need incentives in order to be motivated to act, when they 
are not motivated by respect for the law, they must be motivated by other incentives that stem from 
self-love and their desires for advantage or pleasure of some sort. Thus, unless an agent is 
motivated by respect for the law, her actions will not be virtuous. An agent must feel respect for 
the law and thereby use the law as an incentive to action in order to ensure the morality of her 
actions.  
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If we recall, McDowell maintains that in order to be motivated by moral requirements in 
the proper manner, it is sufficient for agents to recognize certain facts of their situation as 
constituting reasons for acting. It should now be clear that the account put forth by McDowell is 
at odds with Kant’s account of what moral motivation entails. McDowell maintains that agents 
can in fact motivate themselves to act by simply recognizing that certain reasons for acting apply 
to them. He has in mind a picture of the virtuous agent according to which she can recognize that 
her friend is hungry, and by simply recognizing this fact she can determine that morality gives 
her a reason to perform some action, e.g., feed her friend. Furthermore, according to McDowell, 
if this agent is truly virtuous, the recognition that morality gives her a reason to act is sufficient 
to motivate her to act. However, according to Kant, the agent’s recognition that morality gives 
her a reason to act cannot by itself motivate the agent in the proper moral way. This recognition 
can objectively determine the agent’s will, but it cannot subjectively determine her will if she 
does not use her respect for the law as the source of her motivation.  
Kant shows a keen awareness that our sensible nature must play an important role in all 
human motivation when he argues that the moral law can motivate us to act. He does not suggest 
that the rational apprehension of moral laws can motivate us to act on its own. Rather, he tells a 
complex story, according to which our apprehension of moral requirements affects our sensible 
nature by invoking in us respect for the law. Thus, if we follow McDowell in arguing that the 
mere recognition of moral reasons for acting is sufficient to motivate us, we must give up Kant’s 
notion of what it means to be a being with a sensible and rational nature, who depends on 
incentives to be motivated to act. Though Kant argues that our sense-based desires and feelings 
cannot be preconditions for apprehending and being motivated by the law, he does acknowledge 
that our sensible nature must play a role in moral motivation. By appealing to the feeling of 
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respect, Kant acknowledges that there is an important sensible aspect that plays a role in moral 
motivation, while at the same time maintaining that sense-based desires and self-love in no way 
motivate moral action. Thus, in order to defend Kant’s doctrine that moral requirements are 
categorical imperatives it is important to discuss how the feeling of respect allows our sensible 
nature to play a role in moral motivation without undermining the categorical nature of moral 
requirements. McDowell’s account fails to do this and it is thus an unsatisfactory defense of 
Kant’s doctrine.   
Someone might object to my criticism of McDowell by pointing out that he does not claim 
that the mere recognition of reasons for acting is, strictly speaking, sufficient to motivate agents. 
After all, McDowell argues that after recognizing a reason for acting, the agent develops a desire 
to carry out the action commanded. Furthermore, the desire for acting in accordance with the moral 
requirement is the sensible component that motivates the agent to act. Thus, according to the 
objection, McDowell’s account does not fly in the face of Kant’s conception of human beings as 
having a rational and sensible nature, and as beings who must be sensibly affected in order to be 
motivated to act. 
However, this objection can be dismissed because even if McDowell acknowledges that the 
agent’s sensible nature plays a role in moral motivation, his account of how the agent’s sensible 
nature figures into this picture remains at odds with Kant’s theory. McDowell argues that when a 
virtuous agent recognizes that she has certain moral reasons for acting, a desire for so acting will 
be instilled in her. However, this is not how Kant describes the affective component that 
incentivizes agents to act in accordance with moral requirements. Kant explains that when we 
recognize the moral law as an objective determining basis of the will, we are humiliated and our 
self-love is constrained. In other words, when we recognize the moral law as a practical law that 
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applies to us, we recognize that the practical principles that our inclinations compel us to adopt are 
not legitimately authoritative. The moral law then removes the obstacles that our inclinations set 
before us when they tempt us to adopt illegitimate principles. When we constrain our self-love and 
hinder our inclinations, the moral law produces a feeling in us that is importantly different from a 
desire to carry out some action that is recognized as required (KpV 5:72-3).  Whereas the sense-
based desire to carry out an action is essentially empirical, respect is an a priori feeling. The desire 
to carry out an action, being a sense-based desire, arises from our self-love and our desire for 
pleasure, but respect arises from the rational awareness that we are not slaves to these sensible 
desires. Therefore, respect is not a self-interested desire that drives us to pursue pleasure. This is a 
crucial point since a desire to carry out an action would obliterate an action’s moral worth because 
it would imply that the agent finds pleasure in the action itself or the effects that the action could 
bring about and is motivated by the expectation of such pleasure, not by the moral law. Thus, even 
if McDowell recognizes that our sensible nature must play a role in moral motivation, the role he 
assigns to it is incompatible with Kant’s theory of moral motivation.  
As we saw above, McDowell’s account omits any reference to the role that respect plays in 
making the moral law the sole incentive to action and thus fails as a defense of Kant’s doctrine. 
Furthermore, by omitting any reference to the moral feeling of respect, McDowell also misses an 
important distinction between actions that are done in accordance with the letter of the law, and 
actions that are done in the spirit of the law. Once we understand this crucial distinction, it will 
become clear that Kant would object to McDowell’s account because it does not show that agents 
can be motivated to act by moral requirements, but only that agents can be motivated to act in 
accordance with moral requirements. According to Kant, unless an agent makes the moral law his 
sole incentive through the feeling of respect, she will not be motivated by a moral requirement 
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proper. Thus, since he omits any reference to the feeling of respect, McDowell’s account only 
shows that agents can be motivated to act in accordance with moral requirements but not for the 
sake of the moral law. Though McDowell’s agent might guide her actions according to practical 
laws, and though she might carry out actions that are in accordance with the law, she will not be 
motivated by the law. Rather, she will be motivated by her sense-based desires or inclinations. 
Throughout his works on practical philosophy, Kant draws a distinction between an action 
that is done in accordance with the letter of the law and an action that contains the spirit of the law 
(KpV 5:72). He explains that even when an agent carries out an action, having recognized that 
morality requires the action, she can still fail to act virtuously or in a morally worthy manner. In 
the Religion, Kant says that in order to carry out actions that contain the spirit of the law and are 
thus virtuous, or morally valuable, it is not sufficient to act in accordance with practical laws. In 
other words, just because someone is motivated to carry out some action after recognizing that she 
has a moral requirement to do so, it does not yet mean that she is motivated to act by the moral 
law, or by the categorical imperative. For example, Kant says that those who have good mores will 
recognize that certain actions are required or forbidden by the moral law, or, in McDowell’s terms, 
they will recognize that the moral law gives them a reason to omit or to carry out certain actions. 
Furthermore, these agents are often motivated to act in accordance with the moral requirements 
they recognize. However, the moral law does not necessarily motivate those who have good mores 
(RGV 6:30-1).  
The reason why the actions of agents that have good mores are not necessarily morally 
worthy is that, though these agents recognize the correct moral principles, and though they 
determine their actions in accordance with these principles, they do not act from respect for the 
law. Since they do not act from respect for the law, the incentives that motivate these agents are 
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sense-based desires, such as the desire to be liked by others, or the desire to avoid punishment, etc. 
Kant says that those who act in accordance with the moral law but who do not do so from respect 
for the law subordinate the moral law to the principle of self-love (RGV 6:30). He suggests that 
these agents are not motivated by the sole incentive that preserves the morality in actions, i.e. 
respect for the moral law. Thus, they determine their actions in accordance with the law, but the 
law does not motivate them.  
From Kant’s discussion, it is clear that in order to give a proper account of moral 
motivation, it is not sufficient to claim that human beings can recognize moral reasons for acting, 
or moral principles, and can determine their actions in accordance with these principles. 
According to McDowell’s account, if an agent recognizes certain requirements and is motivated 
to act in accordance with these requirements, we can infer that she was motivated by the moral 
requirement in accordance with which she determined her action. However, as we have seen, 
Kant does not agree with McDowell on this point. According to Kant, in order to infer that the 
agent was in fact motivated by the law and its requirements, we must account for how the law 
itself became her incentive and not just the rule by which she guided her actions 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of my criticisms has not been to argue that McDowell’s interpretation is not 
adequate as an account of moral motivation. Rather, the goal of my paper has been to argue that 
McDowell’s account fails as a defense of Kant’s particular theory that moral requirements are 
categorical imperatives. Though my arguments do not refute McDowell’s theory on its own 
terms, they do cast doubt on his account by bringing to light three main objections that Kant 
would have against its validity. Kant believed that categorical requirements must have certain 
features, and that they needed to motivate agents in a very particular fashion in order to be 
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legitimate categorical or moral requirements. I think Kant had good reasons to believe that in 
order to prove that moral requirements are categorical imperatives, we must be able to argue that 
they are not grounded in experience, that they motivate through an active constrain of and 
struggle against sense-based desires, and that the moral law itself can become an incentive for 
agents through the feeling of respect, rather than being a mere rule in accordance with which to 
model one’s external actions. I hope to have shed light on Kant’s reasons for thinking that moral 
requirements must meet these criteria if they are truly moral requirements and thus categorical 
imperatives. Furthermore, I hope to have motivated some concerns regarding the validity of 
McDowell’s approach for arguing that moral requirements are categorical imperatives.  
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